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STATEMENT OFTHE ISSUES 
Did the District Court err by granting summary judgment despite Mr. Robertson's 
passing mention of Rule 56(f) in a paragraph of his Opposition to UCCU's Motion for 
Summary Judgment? 
Did material facts remain at issue when the District Court granted UCCU's Second 
Motion for Summary Judgment? 
Did the District Court err by holding Mr. Robertson had breached the credit 
agreement? 
Did the District Court err by ruling that Mr. Robertson either did not comply with 
U.C.A. § 57-1 -31 or could not rely upon U.C.A. § 57-1 -31 to cure his defaults? 
Did the District Court err by ruling that UCCU complied with notice requirements 
set forth in the subject credit agreement? 
Did the District Court deny Mr. Robertson due process or open access to the 
Courts? 
Should this Court grant UCCU's its attorney's fees incurred opposing this appeal? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
A challenge to a summary judgment generally "presents for review only 
conclusions of law because, by definition, cases decided on summary judgment do not 
resolve factual disputes." Schurtz v. BMW of North America, 814 P.2d 1108, 1111 (Utah 
1991). Because summary judgment is granted as a matter of law rather than fact, the 
appellate court is free to reappraise the trial court's legal conclusions. Winegar v. Froerer 
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Corp., 813 P.2d 104,107 (Utah 1991). The appellate court reviews those conclusions for 
correctness, without according deference to the trial court. Country Oaks Condominium 
Management Comm. v. Jones, 851 P.2d 640, 641 (Utah 1993); Allen v. Prudential 
Property & Casualty Ins. Co., 839 P.2d 798, 800 (Utah 1992). This nondeferential 
standard of review also applies to the threshold issue of whether there are no material 
issues of fact such that summary judgment is in order,. Neiderhauser Builders & Dev. 
Corp. v. Campbell, 824 P.2d 1193, 1196 (Utah App.1992). 
In the present case, Mr. Robertson's Appellate Brief not only challenges the 
granting of summary judgment in favor of UCCU, but also claims that the District Court 
denied a motion based upon Rule 56(f) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. "[The 
Supreme Court of Utah] has held that when a party timely presents an affidavit under rule 
56(f) stating reasons why it is unable to proffer an evidentiary affidavit in opposition to 
its opponent's motion for summary judgment, the trial court's discretion is invoked." 
United Park City Mines Co. v. Greater Park City Co., 870 P.2d 880, 893 (Utah 1993); see 
also Cox v. Winters, 678 P.2d 311, 312-13 (Utah 1984); Jones v. Bountiful City Corp., 
834 P.2d 556, 561 (Utah Ct.App.1992). Accordingly, the appellate court reviews a trial 
court's decision to grant or deny a rule 56(f) motion under the abuse of discretion 
standard. "Under this standard, [the appellate court] will not reverse unless the decision 
exceeds the limits of reasonability." State v. Larsen, 865 P.2d 1355, 1361 (Utah 1993) 
(citations omitted); see also Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch., 860 P.2d 937, 938 (Utah 1993). 
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CONSTTTUTIONALAND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 56(f) 
(f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits of a party 
opposing the motion that the party cannot for reasons stated present by affidavit facts 
essential to justify the party's opposition, the court may refuse the application for 
judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to 
be taken or discovery to be had or may make such other order as is just. 
Utah Code Annotated § 57-1-31 
§ 57-1-31. Trust deeds-Default in performance of obligations secured-Reinstatement-
Cancellation of recorded notice of default 
(1) Whenever all or a portion of the principal sum of any obligation secured by a trust 
deed has, prior to the maturity date fixed in the obligation, become due or been declared 
due by reason of a breach or default in the performance of any obligation secured by the 
trust deed, including a default in the payment of interest or of any installment of principal, 
or by reason of failure of the trustor to pay, in accordance with the terms of the trust deed, 
taxes, assessments, premiums for insurance, or advances made by the beneficiary in 
accordance with terms of the obligation or of the trust deed, the trustor or the trustor's 
successor in interest in the trust property or any part of the trust property or any other 
person having a subordinate lien or encumbrance of record on the trust property or any 
beneficiary under a subordinate trust deed, at any time within three months of the filing 
for record of notice of default under the trust deed, if the power of sale is to be exercised, 
may pay to the beneficiary or the beneficiary's successor in interest the entire amount then 
due under the terms of the trust deed (including costs and expenses actually incurred in 
enforcing the terms of the obligation, or trust deed, and the trustee's and attorney's fees 
actually incurred) other than that portion of the principal as would not then be due had no 
default occurred, and thereby cure the existing default. After the beneficiary or 
beneficiary's successor in interest has been paid and the default cured, the obligation and 
trust deed shall be reinstated as if no acceleration had occurred. 
(2) If the default is cured and the trust deed reinstated in the manner provided in 
Subsection (1), and a reasonable fee is paid for cancellation, including the cost of 
recording the cancellation of notice of default, the trustee shall execute, acknowledge, and 
deliver a cancellation of the recorded notice of default under the trust deed; and any 
trustee who refuses to execute and record this cancellation within 30 days is liable to the 
person curing the default for all actual damages resulting from this refusal. A 
reconveyance given by the trustee or the execution of a trustee's deed constitutes a 
cancellation of a notice of default. Otherwise, a cancellation of a recorded notice of 
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default under a trust deed is, when acknowledged, entitled to be recorded and is sufficient 
if made and executed by the trustee in substantially the following form: 
Cancellation of Notice of Default 
The undersigned hereby cancels the notice of default filed for record 
(month\day\year), and recorded in Book , Page , Records of 
County, (or filed of record (month\day\year), with recorder's entry No. , 
County), Utah, which notice of default refers to the trust deed executed by and 
as trustors, in which is named as beneficiary and as trustee, and filed 
for record (month\day\year), and recorded in Book , Page , Records of 
County, (or filed of record (month\day\year), with recorder's entry No. 
, County), Utah. 
(legal description) 
Signature of Trustee 
Utah Code Annotated §57-1-32 
§ 57-1-32. Sale of trust property by trustee—Action to recover balance due upon 
obligation for which trust deed was given as security—Collection of costs and attorney's 
fees 
At any time within three months after any sale of property under a trust deed as provided 
in Sections 57-1-23, 57-1-24, and 57-1-27, an action may be commenced to recover the 
balance due upon the obligation for which the trust deed was given as security, and in that 
action the complaint shall set forth the entire amount of the indebtedness that was secured 
by the trust deed, the amount for which the property was sold, and the fair market value of 
the property at the date of sale. Before rendering judgment, the court shall find the fair 
market value of the property at the date of sale. The court may not render judgment for 
more than the amount by which the amount of the indebtedness with interest, costs, and 
expenses of sale, including trustee's and attorney's fees, exceeds the fair market value of 
the property as of the date of the sale. In any action brought under this section, the 
prevailing party shall be entitled to collect its costs and reasonable attorney fees incurred. 
Utah Code Annotated § 78B-6-908 
Attorney fees 
(1) In all cases of foreclosure when an attorney's fee is claimed by the plaintiff, the 
amount shall be fixed by the court. No other or greater amount shall be allowed or 
decreed than the sum which shall appear by the evidence to be actually charged by and to 
be paid to the attorney for the plaintiff. 
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(2) If it shall appear that there is an agreement or understanding to divide the fees 
between the plaintiff and his attorney, or between the attorney and any other person 
except an attorney associated with him in the cause, the defendant shall only be ordered to 
pay the amount to be retained by the attorney or attorneys. 
Utah Constitution: Article I, Section 11 
Courts open-Redress of injuries 
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to him in his person, 
property or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, which shall be 
administered without denial or unnecessary delay; and no person shall be barred from 
prosecuting or defending before any tribunal in this State, by himself or counsel, any civil 
cause to which he is a party. 
STATEMENT OFTHE CASE 
In May of 2009, Mr. Robertson obtained a loan from UCCU for the purchase of real property. 
After closing and funding the loan, UCCU attempted to transfer the loan to Wells Fargo Bank. Wells 
Fargo Bank discovered that the tax returns that Mr. Robertson had submitted to UCCU were 
substantially different than the tax relums that Mr. Robertson had ac^ 
Internal Revenue Code. Due to Mr. Robertson's fraud, Wells Faigo Bank refused to receive the loan. 
Mr. Robertson's false representations to UCCU during the loan application process were a clear breach 
of the subject credit agreement In addition, Mr. Robertson failed to occupy the home as his primary 
residence in breach of the subject credit agreement. As Mr. Robertson's had breached the subject credit 
agreement, UCCU demanded that Mr. Robertson cure his breaches of contract and UCCU elected to 
accelerate the M balance of the loan. When he faHed to do so, UC(X^ filed a judicM foreclosure actioa 
The District Court found that Robertson had breached the subject a M t agreement aM 
property may be sold pursuant to the judicial foreclosure statute. 
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STATEMENT OFFACTS 
On or near May 1,2009, Defendant Mike L. Robertson Sr. (hereinafter "Mr. Robertson" or 
"Defendant') applied for a loan from Utah Community Credit Union (hereinafter "UCCU" or 
'Tlaintiff') to enable the purchase of real property located at 445 North 100 East, Spanish Fork, 
Utah 84660 (the "Subject Property"). R548. At the time of the loan closing on May 28,2009, 
Mr. Robertson signed a Deed of Trust which provided at paragraph 6 that Robertson (as 
"Borrower") would occupy the property as his principal residence "unless extenuating 
circumstances exist which are beyond [his] control." R547. The security agreement also 
provided, in paragraph 8 that the Borrower would be in default if "materially false, 
misleading, or inaccurate information or statements" were made during the application 
process. Id. The loan closed, the funds were disbursed, £ind title to the Subject Property was 
transferred to Mr. Robertson on May 28,2009. Id. 
Several weeks later, when UCCU attempted to transfer the loan to Wells Fargo, it was 
discovered that Robertson had filed actual tax returns with the Internal Revenue Service for the 
years 2007 and 2008 that were not the same as the returns Robertson provided to UCCU when 
he applied for the loan from UCCU. R546. Robertson now insists that he was never asked to 
provide actual signed tax returns but that he elected, in this case, to provide financial 
information on IRS forms to support the application. R545. In response to inquiries from 
UCCU as to why Mr. Robertson had submitted inaccurate tax forms, Mr. Robertson sent a 
letter to UCCU that is now pages 76-77 of the Appellate Record and is included in the 
Addendum hereto. Before Mr. Robertson frilly contemplated that he was going to be 
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involved in litigation, he simply admitted that he adopted the practice of providing 
lenders with false tax returns because lenders would not lend him sufficient funds when 
he provided accurate tax returns. R76-77. 
Counsel for UCCU sent a letter on June 26,2009, informing Robertson that because of 
the inaccuracies regarding his income in the application process the obligation was in 
default. R545. Mr. Robertson swears that because of the uncertainty generated by the 
foreclosure and collection procedures he decided to not move into the home. Id. The home 
was vacant for three months and then became occupied by Mr. Robertson's daughter; it has 
never been occupied as a residence by Robertson. R545. 
After the litigation ensued, UCCU filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on October 
4,2010. R100-110. Mr. Robertson opposed the Motion For Summary Judgment. R278-298. 
The District Court partially granted the Motion for Summary Judgment, holding that Mr. 
Robertson breached the contract and was in default under the Deed of Trust because he provided 
materially misleading information during the loan application process and because he has failed 
to occupy the property within 60 days of closing. R543-44. The District Court also ruled that 
the only possible reason for Robertson's use of the complete set of IRS forms was to mislead 
UCCU to create the impression that Robertson's declaration of income corresponded to his 
declaration of income to the federal government. R543. However, the District Court held 
at that time that on the present state of the record, the Court was precluded from awarding judgment 
for the acceleration amount, together with costs and fees because formal compliance with the 
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notice requirements of paragraph 22 of the Deed of Trust was a necessary predicate to 
acceleration of the debt to continue with foreclosure. R541. 
UCCU filed a Second Motion for Summary Judgment on February 15,2011 for the 
purpose of presenting the District Court with a more complete record that demonstrated that 
UCCU had in fact complied with the notice requirements of the contract. R624-640. In 
connection to that motion, UCCU attached a letter that counsel for UCCU had mailed to 
Mr. Robertson and his attorney on June 24,2010, informing Mr. Robertson of his right to 
cure. R605-606. Upon reviewing the said letter and the second affidavit of counsel for 
UCCU, the District Court ruled that Mr. Robertson was provided adequate and sufficient notice 
of the default and right to cure. R1020. The District Court granted UCCU's Second Motion 
for Summary Judgment by executing an Order dated October 3,2011. R1012-1026 
The District Court held that Mr. Robertson's loan was due and payable in full in the 
amount of One Hundred and Fifty One Thousand Three Hundred and Eighty-Four Dollars 
and Seventy-Three Cents ($151,384.73) as of May 24, 2010, plus interest thereafter at the 
rate of 4.75% until paid in full, plus attorney's fees and costs incurred after April 5, 2011. 
R1012. 
Even though the litigation went on for 15 months at the District Court level, Mr. 
Robertson never completed any discovery disclosures or sought any discovery from 
UCCU. Both parties were in possession of a complete set of the loan application and 
documentation, and both parties had a copy of the letter wherein Mr. Robertson openly 
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admitted that he had adopted a practice of providing lenders with inaccurate tax returns so 
that he could obtain the loans he believed he rightfully deserved. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Court did not fail to properly rule upon a Rule 56(f) Motion. Mr. Robertson 
did not file a motion. Mr. Robertson simply inserted a reference to Rule 56(f) in his 
Opposition to UCCU's first Motion For Summary Judgment and claimed that "[t]he 
issues that needed to be ferreted out [were] many". In light of the absence of affidavits 
complying with Rule 56(f) and in light of Mr. Robertson's admission that he adopted the 
practice of providing lenders with false tax returns so that they would lend him money, it 
was well within the boundaries of reason for the District Court to conclude that Mr. 
Robertson had intentionally misled UCCU and that Mr. Robertson's mention of Rule 
56(f) was entirely dilatory. 
Mr. Robertson erroneously asserts in his Appellate Brief that the principal and 
interest balance was still in dispute when the District Court granted final summary 
judgment in favor of UCCU. However, the total amount owed was not disputed by Mr. 
Robertson at the time that the District Court granted UCCU's Second Motion for 
Summary Judgment. UCCU presented the Court with an affidavit setting forth the amount 
owed, and Mr. Robertson did not dispute the affidavit. 
When the Court granted UCCU's Motion for Summary Judgment, there was no 
dispute regarding the fact that Mr. Robertson had provided inaccurate 1040s to UCCU 
during the application process or that Mr. Robertson had not moved into the Subject 
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Property. Mr. Robertson's breaches were clear violations of his contractual obligations. 
The only issues before the District Court regarding the false representations and failure to 
occupy were issues of contractual interpretation, not fact. 
The District Court did not err in ruling that Mr. Robertson could not cure his defaults 
under U.C.A. §57-1-31. Utah Code § 57-1 -31 is inapplicable to the present case, the defense 
was moot by the time that Mr. Robertson raised it, and Mr. Robertson did not comply with 
section even if it was applicable and timely 
The District Court did not err in ruling that UCCU had given Mr. Robertson notice 
required by the contract. Counsel for UCCU provided actual notice to Mr. Robertson and Mr. 
Robertson's attorney. The notice was provided more titian 30 days before suit was filed and 
the counting of time should be conducted as provided in the contract, not as the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure dictate for court filings that require service under the Rules. 
The District Court did not err in dismissing Mr. Robertson's Counterclaim without 
giving him his "day in court". The granting of summary judgment in this case by the District 
Court did not violate either state or federal constitutional rights of Mr. Robertson by denying 
him his "day in court." Mr. Robertson had full access to the Fourth District Court of Appeals. 
ARGUMENT 
I. It was proper for the District Court to grant summary judgment despite 
Mr. Robertson's passing mention of Rule 56(f) in a paragraph of his Opposition to 
UCCU's Motion for Summary Judgment 
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In his Appellate Brief, Mr. Robertson asserts that the District Court erred by 
granting summary judgment despite a pending Rule 56(f) Motion. However, Mr. 
Robertson did not file a motion. Mr. Robertson simply inserted a paragraph in his 
Opposition to UCCU's first Motion For Summary Judgment that Mr. Robertson titled 
"56(f)". R279. In that paragraph, Mr. Robertson asserted that "[t]he issues that needed to 
be ferreted out are many." Id. Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 56(f) provides: 
Should it appear from the affidavits of a party opposing the motion that the party 
cannot for reasons stated present by affidavit facts essential to justify the party's 
opposition, the court may refuse the application for judgment or may order a 
continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be taken or 
discovery to be had or may make such other order as is just. 
As stated in the "Standard of Review" section above, an Appellate Court reviews a trial 
court's decision to grant or deny a rule 56(f) motion under the abuse of discretion 
standard. The District Court's decision in the present case to grant summary judgment 
was entirely within the limits of reasonability. Mr. Robertson did not file any affidavit in 
support of his Rule 56(f) assertion. Mr. Robertson did attach an affidavit to his 
Opposition to UCCU's Motion for Summary Judgment (R266-277), but Mr. Robertson's 
affidavit contained absolutely no Rule 56(f) component in that it did not provide any 
tangible or even colorable reason why Mr. Robertson was unable at that time to present 
additional information or facts essential to justify his opposition. In fact, Mr. Robertson 
proactively asserted a factual position in that affidavit and throughout this dispute -Mr. 
Robertson asserted that he was never asked for nor provided any tax returns. R268; see 
also, Mr. Robertson's Appellate Brief, line 7 page 21. Mr. Robertson contends that he 
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simply provided financial statements that happened to be on tax forms as opposed to 
"signed and filed" tax returns. R275, f 9, 13. Mr. Robertson has never disputed that as 
part of the application process he submitted the documents to UCCU that are now pages 
22-34 of the Appellate Record. As the Court can plainly see, said pages of the Appellate 
Record are 1040 tax forms. The Court can also see that the 2008 return is signed by Mr. 
Robertson. Mr. Robertson would have this Court believe that Mr. Robertson submitted the 
filled-out 1040 tax forms as mere income statements with no intent to deceive or defraud 
UCCU even though he never provided a 56(f) affidavit claiming that he was asked for 
"income statements" or that further discovery would show that UCCU asked him to 
provide income statements and not tax returns. 
When the District Court ruled on Plaintiff's First Motion for Summary Judgment 
and found that Mr. Robertson did have intent to mislead and deceive UCCU, the District 
Court had possession of the letter drafted by Mr. Robertson that is now pages 76-77 of the 
Appellate Record. Mr. Robertson stated in an affidavit that he provided the said letter to 
UCCU in response to inquiries from UCCU as to why Mr. Robertson had submitted the 
subject 1040s for 2007 and 2008 that were different than the actual tax returns he had 
filed with the Internal Revenue Service for those years. R273. It is also apparent on the 
face of the letter that Mr. Robertson was replying to an inquiry by UCCU as to why Mr. 
Robertson had provided the inaccurate 1040s during the application process. R76-77. 
Before Mi*. Robertson fully contemplated that he was going to be involved in litigation he 
simply outlined the truth in the letter and substantively admitted that he adopted the 
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practice of providing lenders with false tax returns because lenders would not lend him 
sufficient funds when he provided accurate tax returns. R76-66. Mr. Robertson implies 
in his Appellate Brief that the key question is whether UCCU had ever asked Mr. 
Robertson for tax returns. Mr. Robertson doesn't want the Court to focus on the fact that 
Mr. Robertson provided tax returns whether UCCU asked for them or not, leading the 
District Court to find that: 
"Robertson noted that before he adopted the practice of providing different 
versions of tax returns to lenders and the IRS that he was not able to obtain the 
credit he thought he deserved. He knew that the lenders expected tax returns. The 
only possible reason for his use of the complete set of IRS forms was to mislead 
the lender to create the impression that his declaration of income corresponded to 
his declaration of income to the federal government." 
R543-544. 
Even if, in an attempt to view the facts in the light most favorable to Mr. Robertson, the 
District Court accepted Mr. Robertson's claim that he had not been asked for tax returns, 
it was entirely reasonable for the District Court to conclude that the evidence before the 
District Court left no material fact in dispute and that Mr. Robertson had intentionally 
misled UCCU. 
Mr. Robertson's claim in his Appellate Brief that the Court never ruled on his Rule 
56(f) Motion is simply untrue, as the only mention of Rule 56(f) by Mr. Robertson was 
part of his Opposition to UCCU's Motion for Summary Judgment (R278-79) and the trial 
Court issued a ruling detailing why it partially granted UCCU's Motion. R539-548. 
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1 his Court has consistently held that a trial court need not ?rrmt ru;c '^. 1) motions 
P.2d at 31243; Strand r. hstu i-iml St?**!* n/v - " «/;-.. -,;7 . ' / ' • • - ' ? — • •: «.• 
afeo /ones, 834 P.2d al 5^1, Sandy City \. Sail Lake tuiuti), 794 P.2d 482, 488 (Utah 
CtApp. 1990^ In the present case, Mr. Robertson could have presented an affida\ it 
p:* ;. !• ^ .,..:.,!.- • J--, i , N-: a Miui. a Maiement on tax forms. Mr. 
collaborate such a claim. By simply claiming repeatedly that he was not asked for tax 
returns, however, Mr. Robertson did not identify for the District Court am v ^ ral K 
reason why additional delay vumiu nave resulted in c\ iucike Uui a material iaa vi a> in 
dispufi" Mi Ruber! son simpl> [.p-^t. -.. . *: ,^  P- -H !!• ,. ... 
for the District Court that his passive mention of Rule 56(f) was anything more than 
dilatory. 
'hi- \ .)i>ert>oi, also could have sought discovery in this case it he had any reason 
to belie\ e that disco\ eiy w oi lid ha * ' e ii u lie w \\t x 1 that he j \? as asked foi "financial 
statements" and that UCCU knew the iU4Us were not his actual tax returns. The parties 
and attonieys for the parties communicated for several months before litigation was filed, 
and both parties were in possession ui -\'i reic\ ant documentation because M•• <o^er^or 
initiate any formal discovery during the 15 months between the time the G>r : UP •* • 
filed and the time the Court granted final summary judgment. Not only did Mr. Robertson 
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not seek to initiate any formal discovery, Mr. Robertson filed his own Motion for 
Summary Judgment, which inherently took the position that no material facts remained in 
dispute (R851-863). In many respects, the present case is factually similar to Crossland 
Savings v. Hatch, 877 P.2d 1241. In Crossland, the Supreme Court of Utah found that 
even though little time passed between the filing of the complaint and the granting of 
summary judgment by the relevant district court, the case was relatively simple and the 
defendant in the case had displayed an apparent lack of interest in discovery such that the 
district court did not exceed the limits of reasonability when it concluded that the 
defendant's Rule 56(f) motion was dilatory. The present case is also simple. Mr. 
Robertson did not file any affidavit in support of his Rule 56(f) motion; the Fourth 
District Court had Mr. Robertson's written admission that he had adopted a practice of 
providing lenders with inaccurate information (R76-77); Mr. Robertson did not seek any 
discovery; and Mr. Robertson's own motion for summary judgment inherently took the 
position that no facts were in dispute. R851-863. 
Even though counsel for Mr. Robertson and counsel for UCCU communicated 
frequently about the case and shared any necessary information at will, Mr. Robertson 
now claims that he was unable to proceed with discovery because the parties did not 
complete initial disclosures. Mr. Robertson did not raise that proposition with the trial 
court in any motion. "In order to preserve an issue for appeal the issue must be presented 
to the trial court in such a way that the trial court has an opportunity to rule on that issue." 
Pratt v Nelson, 2007 UT 41, 164 P.3d 366, 372-373. The Supreme Court of Utah has set 
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foi Ill three factors that help determine w hether the trial con; i liad such an opportunity: " 
and (3) a party must introduce supporting evidence or relevant legal autiiorir\ " Id In 
short, aparty ma> not claiir to have preserved an issue for appeal b\ "merely mentioning 
... an issue without introducing supporting evidence or relevant legal authority," Id. 
orderly procedure, the trial court ought to be given an opportun ' • u I d ivs ! ; M m ed 
error and, if appropriate, correct i t ' " 1 -: : the present case, Mr. Robertson did not raise 
the issue that initial disclosures were not made, therefore, it was not raised in ?. timeh or 
specific fashion and w a s not i aised \ v itl i airy si.i -m <m. • JL:.ti .uu» * - i\ 
Though Mr. Robertson did not raise a Rule }N -. ..?• '^ -^^- - mul 
though he filed his own motion for summary judgment seeking to end the case, he now 
proposes on page 15 of his Appellate Brief that the current version of ITtah Ri.V oT r'*.'! 
Procedure 26 pi ecludedl ii.ii I ft om mo\ ing foi \ • ai d w ith discovery \\ .no link nib. esse 
began, however, the previous version (-* :!. * I •!:•'-^  • .^ i: •>•*'••.'• .-M * v
 0h-- -• 
also made no effort to produce initial disclosures. 1 lie District Court simpi) d,d noi 
commit err because A« Ir Robertson had admitted in writing what he had done and no facts 
wen; in dispute 
II- No material issues of fact remained when, the District 1 oml m anted 
UCCU's Second Motion for Summary Judgment 
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Mr. Robertson erroneously asserts that material issues of fact were still at issue 
when the District Court granted final summary judgment in favor of UCCU. In particular, 
pages 18 through 20 of Mr. Robertson's Appellate Brief assert that when the District 
Court granted UCCU's Second Motion for Summary Judgment, the total dollar amount 
that Mr. Robertson owed was still in dispute. However, the total amount owed was not 
disputed by Mr. Robertson at the time that the District Court granted UCCU's Second 
Motion for Summary Judgment. 
On lines 14-16 of page 19 of Mr. Robertson's Appellate Brief, Mr. Robertson 
quotes the District Court's ruling on UCCU's First Motion for Summary Judgment, 
wherein the District Court found that Mr. Robertson had at that time disputed the balance 
asserted by UCCU. R543. The paragraph of the District Court's ruling that is quoted by 
Appellant is found on page 543 of the Appellate Record. At that time, Defendant had 
claimed in his Opposition to UCCU's first motion for summary judgment that UCCU did 
not have the right to accelerate the full debt. In the Statement of Undisputed Facts 
contained in Plaintiff's Second Motion for Summary Judgment, UCCU asserted at 
paragraph 16 that Defendant owed $145,102.08 in principal and interest as of February 
11,2011. R637. The balance set forth in Paragraph 16 of UCCU's Second Motion for 
Summary Judgment was supported by an affidavit of Jeff Meyers, UCCU's Vice President 
of Real Estate Lending. R602-603. In Mr. Robertson's Opposition to UCCU's Second 
Motion for Summary Judgment, Mr. Robertson responded to paragraph 16 of UCCU's 
"Undisputed Facts" by saying only "Disputed. Plaintiff has not complied with the default 
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provisions of the Deed of 1 rust. I neie i.u.-> Deen no proper notice, KOVV. Djiviidui;: *IK; 
principal and interest amount was incorrect or in dispute, he only argued to th< DNt;*. :t 
Court that UCCU still did not have the ability to accelerate. 
In Jones v. Hinkle, 611 P.2d733 (1980), the Supreme Court ofUtah held that when a 
specific evidentiary facts ^lt-'\\ r-> ;hi-^ ,;vis:i iicn'mi< <- . • -,; »•• ' - , :
 iL. ikit 
was proper in the present case and UCCU was entitled to judgment as a matter of law 
because Mr. Robertson failed to identify with specificity any material fact. 
Ill, I he District Court properly held Mr. Robertson had breached the credit 
agreement 
The Third and Fourth Sections of Mr. Robertson's Appellate Brief argue that the 
District Court erred by finding that Mr. Robertson had breached the subject credit agreement. 
1. he Disti ict Coin t found that Mi Robertson had breached the suoj v\; cicdn agreement m i) 
making .. -< *vr *! ^i^vnu^^:1-^ >• ! - Tl J during the applicat ion pi ocess a rid 2 .-ng 
to occupy the subject residence as Mr. Robertson's primary residence. R543. 
A. Material misrepresentations to UCCII during the application process. 
Defendant breached the contract ^  it! ll 'laintiffb) pro\ iding materially false, 
misleading or inaccurate information, or In failing (opn,\ u\v nidleiiil mtonnatii >n Hie 
Deed of Trust in the present action sets forth in section 8, page 6: 
Borrower shall be in defai ill: if ,, di it ing the I -oai I application pi ocess, Bonxn ve r or 
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any persons or entities acting at the direction of Borrower or with Borrower's 
knowledge or consent gave materially false, misleading, or inaccurate information or 
statements to Lender (or failed to provide Lender with material information) in 
connection with the Loan. 
R0015. 
As set forth above, Mr. Robertson has contended throughout the litigation that he "was never 
asked for nor provided any [tax returns]." R268; see also, Mr. Robertson's Appellate Brief, 
line 7 page 21. Mr. Robertson contends that he simply provided financial statements that 
happened to be on tax forms as opposed to what Mr. Robertson refers to as "signed and filed" 
tax returns. R275, ^  9,13. As set forth above, however, Mr. Robertson has never disputed 
that he submitted the documents to UCCU that are now pages 22-34 of the Appellate Record. 
Those documents are clearly 1040 tax forms. The tax returns that Defendant submitted to 
Plaintiff represented that Defendant had made more than $ 100,000.00 each of the subject years, 
but the actual tax returns that Plaintiff had submitted to the Internal Revenue Service reported 
that Defendant had business income of less than $20,000.00 each of the subject years. R888. 
After the loan had funded, UCCU attempted to transfer the servicing of the loan to Wells 
Fargo Bank. Rl 09. Wells Fargo Bank spot audited the application and discovered what Mr. 
Robertson had done. R108. UCCU was not aware that Mr. Robertson had provided false 
tax returns to Plaintiff until after the loan had funded and until Wells Fargo Bank 
discovered it. R105. 
Mr. Robertson would have this Court believe that he submitted the filled-out 1040 tax 
forms as mere income statements with no intent to deceive or defraud UCCU. However, Mr. 
Robertson has never denied that he authored the letter that is now pages 76-77 of the 
Appellate Record. Mr. Robertson admitted in the letter that he adopted the practice of 
providing lenders with false tax returns because they would not lend him sufficient funds 
when he provided actual tax returns. R76-77. Therefore, there was no material fact in 
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dispute when the District Court found that Mr. Robertson breached Section 8 of the credit 
agreement by providing materially false, misleading or inaccurate information, or by failing 
to provide Lender with information he knew to be material. R541. It was clearly material to 
the loan process that the tax returns Mr. Robertson submitted were not his actual tax returns. 
Because Mr. Robertson had a contractual obligation to not pro\ ide I ICC I J \ v ith any 
misleading information, Mr. Robertson had a contractual obligation to inform UCCIJ that the 
1040s he submitted were not his filed tax returns arid did not acci u ately represent his tax 
returns. 
B. Failure of Mr. Robertson to occupy the Subject Property 
Paragraph 6 of the subject Deed of Trust provides that: 
"Borrower shall occupy, establish, and use the Property as Borrower's principal 
residence within 60 days after the execution of this Security Instrument and sha!! 
continue to oeeup\ the Property as Borrower's principal r^ ; jeriee fo^  »• le^* :K 
year after the date of occupancy"" (H 016» 
UCCU asserted in its First Motion for Summary Judgment that Mr. Robertson breached 
Paragraph 6 by failing to occupy the Subject Property within 60 days. (R10 ^  In his 
Aj-wtjUU'h •.' * VIK1!.* i-MII:^'*:••" : ' .\: * i. :•; :\rt>o!i U. u.a rdo.: lis 
old residence. Mr. Robertson has.iic\ or '^ MT?CV1 that ! • * a::n.r < iv*:^. i n; .„• , 
rental property excused Mr. Robertson fro in occupying the Subject Property as his 
primary residence. I he only argument that Mr. Robertson made to the Distrio! novv\ in his 
Subject Property within 60 da> s w as 1 hat'I ICCI J conta.d < sd legal coi msel regarding Mi 
Robertson's fraud and that the threat of litigation created great uncertainty that was 
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"beyond his control." (R272). The District Court was correct in finding that even if the 
threat of litigation worried Mr. Robertson, the mental wrangling presented no tangible 
barrier to Mr. Robertson moving into the house. 
The fact that Mr. Robertson has appealed the District Court's finding that he 
breached the subject Deed of Trust by failing to occupy the home is inconsistent with 
admissions that Mr. Robertson made to the District Court. Counsel for Mr. Robertson 
stated during oral arguments before the District Court that: 
"[Robertson] had a decision point when he decided to move his daughter in and 
some of his stuff in, but not occupy [the subject home himself]. Those are decision 
points and those things have consequences for [Mr. Robertson]. And the Court has 
imposed the consequences of those decisions points on him, and fairly so." 
(R1054,pgl2,lnl06). 
No material fact was in dispute when the District Court concluded that Mr. Robertson 
should not be excused from a contractual obligation due to uncertainty that he caused. 
The only issue before the District Court regarding failure to occupy was one of 
contractual interpretation, not fact. The District Court rightfully found that Mr. 
Robertson's failure to move into the Subject Property was not beyond his control. 
IV. The District Court did not err in ruling that Mr. Robertson could not cure his 
defaults under U.C.A. § 57-1-31. 
Defendant asserted to the District Court in opposition to UCCU's Second Motion for 
Summary Judgment (and has now asserted in his Appellate Brief) that he cured any default 
for fraud or failure to occupy the home. R695-697. He asserted that his breach was cured 
when he availed himself of rights provided in Utah Code § 57-1-31(1). Utah Code Section 
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5n 1-31(1) provides that: 
(1) Whenever all or a portion of the principal sum of any obligation secured by a trust 
deed has, prior to the maturity date fixed in the obligation, become due or been 
declared due by reason of a breach or default in the performance of any obligation 
secured by the trust deed, including a default in the payment of interest or of any 
installment of principal, or by reason of failure of the trustor to pay, in accordance 
with the terms of the trust deed, taxes, assessments, premiums for insurance, or 
advances made by the beneficiary in accordance with terms of the obligation or of the 
trust deed, the trustor or the trustor's successor in interest in the trust property or any 
part of the trust property or nn\ other per^vi having a subordinate lien or 
encumbrance of record on the trust property or an> beneficiary under a subordinate 
trust deed, at any time within three months of the filing for record of notice of default 
under the trust deed, if the power of sale is to be exercised, may pay to the beneficiary 
or the beneficiary's successor in interest the entire amount then due under the terms of 
the trust deed (including costs and expenses actually incurred in enforcing the terms 
of the obligation. \ M trust deed, and the trustee's and attorney's lees actually incurred) 
other than that portion of the principai as would i:;»i then he due 1 A ' n< default 
occurred, and therehv eure the existing default. A Iter the beneficiary or beneficiary's 
successor in interest has been paid and the default cured, the obligation and trust deed 
shall be reinstated as i rpo iccelenition had <XYUP\V 
At 'the time that Mr. Robert-^p ~,n\v d •- .:.. • " ; -" , »< >sit i< >n I < ) I JCC I J's Sec ond 
Motion for Summary Judgment, the District Court had already decided in its December 6, 
201(1 Memorandum Decision (parfmlK granting lUVU's hrsi Mntmn h i Summary 
Judgment) that Defendant was in default. R.541 Mr. R obertson did not raise Section 57-1-
3 . .i.^  Answer or in opposition lu > ; i . > ] HM \U ; *>n N-r Sunimaiy Judgment, R278-
298. The NSLK- <>*' liability was moot when Defendant first raised ?!v iw - i - * •, 
subsequent Moiioi. I-M' Summary Judgment and in his Opposition to Plaintiff's Second 
Motion for Summary Judgment Mr, ls'oherNon\ filings regarding the meaning of Section s "1-
1-31 amounted to an impermissible motion to reconsider. 
E'- en f aii> i irgumei it 1 )ased oi I I Jl ; ih Code \ n nol i tted § 5 7 • 1 31 was not moot when 
raised by Defendant, Utah Code §57-1-31 u as m »j applicable to the present matter. Utah 
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Code sections 57-1-23 through 57-1-32 relate to the non-judicial foreclosures of trust deeds. 
The property in the present case was foreclosed judicially in the manner permitted for 
mortgages. R758. The proper portion of the Code that governs this case is Title 78B, 
Section 6, Part 9. Defendant acknowledged Title 78B of the Utah Code when it suited him; 
Defendant acknowledged Section 78B-6-908 when he argued that Plaintiff's attorney's fees 
should be limited in the present case. R698. Utah Code Annotated Section 57-1-31 applies 
when attorneys are overseeing non-judicial foreclosure, but the Courts of Utah are not 
rendered powerless to rectify fraud and failure to occupy a primary residence simply because 
a defendant makes monthly payments that are less than the accelerated amount due and that 
do not address the underlying problem. If Defendant's position were the law, courts would be 
powerless to provide relief in any mortgage fraud case if the defendant simply makes 
payments. Surely, Defendant's position is not the public policy adopted or intended by the 
Utah Legislature. Indeed, it was within the District Court's discretion to find that "Perhaps 
the only possible cure was immediate repayment of all sums borrowed." R541. 
Even if Defendant's argument regarding having cured under Utah Code Annotated § 
57-1-31 has not been mooted or is not inapplicable as set forth above, Section 57-1-31 clearly 
does not apply to non-financial defaults. The first line of the Section expressly refers to the 
"sum of any obligation". The word obligation refers to financial sums or financial amounts 
owed. The present case has been brought because of Defendant's false representations and 
his lack of occupying the subject residence as his primary residence. When delineating what 
defaults can be cured pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 57-1-31, the Utah legislature 
expressly delineated that it included "a default in the payment of interest or of any 
installment of principal, or by reason of failure of the trustor to pay, in accordance with the 
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terms of the obligation or ••. the trust weed .emphasis adik- :ieiv:^c. tiu. piaui 
Even if Utah Code § 57-1 o I was not moot when raised by Defendant or inapplicable 
tothepresentjudicial Ksr.^-^uu'. i-Jcic:tua. i. .-.\ .;ui.;u\i ••:•.. • KK a:--' p* -;:s. 
Defendant did not otherwise comply with the Section by paying all of the attorneys fees, 
costs and expenses incurred, rherefore, the District did not err in i Hiding that \;
 t. K-. ^ oertson 
(<» ^•m-ra^^'tv S(.u(.;- • . ^'r::,/ / J . •,:;- o *Mw-.* w ith the Section even 11 it was 
applicable. 
IMl!l££-E£M,I!,l! '"! I by the contract. 
Mr. Robertson asserts in his Appellate Brief that there are two reasons for finding 
liuii the District Court erred when it found r.Y:; I •. I had satisfied paragraph o *>i r^ 
notice to the proper attorney, and 2) "UCCU did not give notice a full 30 days before filing 
suit 
A. UCCU gave notice more than 30 days before filing suit 
1 he second assertion h] • I" « li R obertsonv^ as nev er raised at the District Com t I'\ li 
Robertson never argued to the District Court that H\ ^prlv^: "rn>ner counting" of time 
under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, UCCU did not give a full 30 days of notice to 
Mr. Robertson of its intern n • tile suit. As set forth above, an issue must be preserved at 
2 8 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
from raising the issue for the first time on appeal when he failed to preserve the argument 
at the District Court. 
Even if Mr. Robertson had raised the argument at the District Court, the affidavit 
of counsel for UCCU that is part of the record indicates that the subject notice was mailed 
on May 24, 2010. R608. Mr. Robertson proffers to the Court that the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure dictate that the counting of days should not include three days for mailing, 
weekends, or holidays. However, the Deed of Trust was a contract, not a Court filing 
requiring service of process. The Contract provides at paragraph 15 that "Any notice to 
Borrower in connection with this Security Instrument shall be deemed to have been given 
to Borrower when mailed by first class mail or when actually delivered to Borrower's 
notice address if sent by other means." R89-90. Therefore, the 30 days began when the 
letter was mailed and the only affidavit in this case that even mentions the letter (an 
affidavit of counsel for UCCU), provides that the letter was mailed on May 24, 2010. 
R608. Suit was filed on June 25, more than 30 days after giving the notice. 
B. Notice was properly given to counsel for Mr, Robertson. 
Mr. Robertson asserts in his Appellate Brief that the District Court erred by finding 
that Mr. Robertson had received adequate notice from UCCU of his right to cure before 
UCCU could file suit pursuant to the credit agreement. Defendant asserts notice was not 
proper because counsel for UCCU mailed the notice (R691-695) to the property that is the 
subject of this litigation (the property Mr. Robertson failed to occupy). Mr. Robertson 
claims that the subject property was not the proper address for notice because he had 
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designated in writing that a different address should have been used Id. However, 
paragraph 25 of the Deed of I r list expressly provides that "Borrower requests viat ^pies 
of the notices of defai ill; and sale be sent to Bon owei 's address w hich is the I h open: I y 
Address." R086. Page 2 of the Deed of Trust defines the term "Property Address" as the 
property that was purchased with the loan proceeds (the property Mr, Robertson failed to 
occupy). R94. Paragraph - • o: ;;.*.- ix.^. I i »u.si is more specific than paragraph i * o] 
as was done by counsel for UCCU. 
Furthermore, when counsel for UCCU first contacted Mr. Robertson to demand 
payment in the present case, Mr. Robertson replied with a letter P'74-'7^ M-
R obertson's own lettei designated s * • : •• v - • -•* ; - ,!uuu». .:sc . . p 
wasusedby Mr. Robertson to send the u tv* •! -, d^h nated the Subje* •> Pu*.\ :\ ,<. 
Robertson's return address. Id. In addition, Mr. Robertson was repl>ing to a Jc*nana 
letter sent by counsel for Plaintiff to the subject property. Rn47. 
•  • •-;',-' ! s--: i • unr.pi> '.\n:i ::.v. , . \ \ i ; • • Srust and reply to the 
address Mr. R obertson was expressly using to communicate, Mr. Robertson received actual 
notice. At the iJistnct ( oun. Dcieiklain uiJ no\ dcn\ Miat he received the letter at issue; 
Defendant only claimed that the letter was not served a the ' 1 e ^ r aiKiros- Kfrr: ^ 
Defendant provides no case law in support of the proposMion that "leeal ?--\:e" h nor 
! ' . N V ; ^ " d u h i ; v : ' -,- • .- • . • »\>,
 t*.* <-. , , .; .,>!• * - i t i ^ T n T<:>n •fc4 *!* i i : - . 
parties, "Well accepted rules of contract interpretation require that i the (\uirtl examine tiv 
languag'e of the c 01 i1 i i ict to determine meaning and intent/" t ate Kf >;u. e / <^ v . n-i nv* >/w-
3 0 
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Overton, LLC, 2009 UT 27, paragraph 25. At the time of contracting with each other, the 
parties intended that Mr. Robertson would be notified of how he could cure a given default 
and of the 30 day deadline by which he had to do so. The Supreme Court of Utah has 
repeatedly recognized that: 
117 The underlying purpose in construing or interpreting a contract is to ascertain the 
intentions of the parties to the contract. Peterson v. Coca-Cola USA, 2002 UT 42, ^  9, 
48 P.3d 941; SME Indus., Inc. v. Thompson, Ventulett, Stainback & Assocs., Inc., 
2001 UT 54, f 14, 28 P.3d 669. " 'In interpreting a contract, the intentions of the 
parties are controlling.' " Dixon v. Pro Image, Inc., 1999 UT 89, f 13, 987 P.2d 48 
(quoting Winegar v. Froerer Corp., 813 P.2d 104, 108 (Utah 1991)); see also 
Peterson v. Sunrider Corp., 2002 UT 43, \ 18, 48 P.3d 918. 
In the present case, Mr. Robertson was given notice of how he could cure the contract and the 
deadline by which he had to do so; the intention of the parties was clearly met. Additionally, 
Utah appellate courts recognize that a party receives notice for contractual purposes when he 
receives actual notice even if the notice is sent to an address other than the address specified 
in an agreement. In the Utah case of Chrysler Dodge Country, U.S.A., Inc. v. Cur ley, the 
defendant argued that she had not received adequate notice of a repossession sale of her 
vehicle because the notice in that case was sent to the home of her family member. 782 P.2d 
536. The case indicates that "[a] person "receives" a notice or notification when: (a) it 
comes to his attention; or (b) it is duly delivered at the place of business through which the 
contract was made or at any other place held out by him as the place for receipt of such 
communications." 782 P.2d 536 (1989) at page 539-540 (emphasis added). The Utah Court 
of Appeals found in Curley that the defendant had received sufficient notice. In the present 
case, not only did paragraph 25 of the Deed of Trust require counsel for Plaintiff to mail the 
notice to the subject property, sending the notice to that property was not a material breach 
because Defendant had held the property out as a place of receipt of communication. 
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Not onl;> did Mr. Robertson receive the letter at issue in the present case, Mr. 
appeal that the notice w as not proper because it was received by Richard D. Bradford rather 
tin- !- •-: ! "u :--!tnci i'uMMer M J .i-::C> nrau\. i u vaojcct iirrn was once Bradford and 
Brady, PC, but Mr. Brady was appointed as a Fourth District Judge and left the practice. Not 
only has Mi •*: jdiwrcl ionic 10 the office of counsel for UCCU and called counsel for UCCU 
several times before the nol icew as sei i1 to his; il tentionj :n il I Ii Bi ad] indicate! linw ritingto 
UCCU that Mr. Bradford w ds e»> counsel before Mr. Brad\ left the practice. Vr ktter at 
P - M • - •• * • 4 - ', I n ; \ : . v ^  •»• • • • - i c v - i » ( » c ! k u c : . -.: . . . i v . n e s 
that Mr. Bradford was representing Mr. Robertson at the; time that the notice from UCCU was 
mailed on May 24 ,2010 
"[A]n attorney is the agenioitlie client and knowledge*- n ;iv;vm i n^  - ^ ,H1 
bythe attorney is imputed to the client." Von I lake v. Ihomus 858P.2d 1^3. 1^ -4 n. x (Utah 
case, Mr. Robertson was imputed to have received the notice \ 1 r R (*bertson recei \ ed notice 
iiiiireN^ u-qup.eu »•;. i\i.:..^ i,i;"Ji. - ' - •.. - j J ust. received notice u! the address 
that lie had used TO e< Mnmunicate with counsel for Plaintiff (which address Mr. Robertson hnd 
pronii>cd to uutKv- I-,;N pi imary residence), and received notice at the office of h^ attorik \ It 
is frivolous for Mr. Robertson to continue argi ling that he did not i ecei\ e "legal"' notice. 
VI. The District Court did not err in dismissing Mr. Robertson's Counterclaim 
without giving him his "day in court". 
The first portion of the final secti :)ii of IS l"i R obei tson's Appellate Brief makes the 
same substantive argument as the first section of the Brief- i.e., that the Court should ha\ e 
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allowed more discovery before final rulings were issued in this case. As this Court already 
has UCCU's response set forth above, UCCU will not fully restate the argument made above. 
UCCU does request that this Court take notice that the final section of Mr. Robertson's Brief 
does not cite a single fact that remained in dispute or that would have been better understood 
through more discovery. Nor does that section state what err the District Court may have 
made in connection to any federal or state statute. 
The final section of Mr. Robertson's Appellate Brief, set forth on pages 36 and 37 
thereof, asserts that the granting of summary judgment in this case violated either state or 
federal constitutional rights of Mr. Robertson by denying him his "day in court." Inherent 
within Mr. Robertson's argument is the proposition that a court can never grant summary 
judgment, that a court must always permit a case to go to trial. Mr. Robertson ignores the fact 
that oral arguments were held in this matter. Mi*. Robertson proposes, or at least implies, that 
Jenkins v. Percival, 962 P.2d 796 (Utah 1998), supports the proposition that the Constitution 
guarantees him a "day in court" other than the day he and his counsel already spent in court. 
The Jenkins ruling considers mandatory arbitration clauses in contracts; there is certainly no 
portion of the Jenkins ruling that can be interpreted to mean that a district court cannot grant 
summary judgment, even if oral arguments are not held as they were in this case. Likewise, 
the other cases cited by Mr. Robertson do not support the proposition that a district court may 
not grant summary judgment. 
Article I, Section 11 of the Utah Constitution provides: 
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to him in his person, 
property or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, which shall be 
administered without denial or unnecessary delay; and no person shall be barred 
from prosecuting or defending before any tribunal in this State, by himself or 
counsel, any civil cause to which he is a party. 
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In the present matter, both parties have had complete access to the District Court, and 
neither party has been barred from seeking remedies through it. 
VII. UCCU respectfully requests that this Court grant its attorney's fees 
incurred opposing this appeal. 
UCCU respectfully requests that this Court order Mr. Robertson to pay UCCU's 
attorney's fees incurred in the course of researching, drafting this brief, and any oral 
arguments that may occur. The District Court in this matter awarded UCCU all attorney's fees 
it incurred at the District level. R1012. Attorney's fees are also awardable pursuant to the 
credit agreement and Utah Code § 78B-6-908(l). 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, UCCU respectfully requests that this Court deny Mr. 
Robertson's appeal in its entirety and affirm the rulings of the District Court in their entirety. 
DATED this 9th day of April, 2012. 
HANSEN WRIGHTEDDY& HAWS, P.C. 
PAULD.JAR^fS 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
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ADDENDUM 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure , Rule 56 
(a) For claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or cross-claim or to 
obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the expiration of 20 days from the 
commencement of the action or after service of a motion for summary judgment by the adverse 
party, move for summary judgment upon all or any part thereof. 
(b) For defending party, A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim is asserted 
or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time, move for summary judgment as to all or 
any part thereof. 
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion, memoranda and affidavits shall be in 
accordance with Rule 7. The judgment sought shall be rendered if the pleadings, depositions, 
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that 
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in character, may be rendered 
on the issue of liability alone although there is a genuine issue as to the amount of damages. 
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under this rule judgment is not rendered 
upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and a trial is necessary, the court at the hearing of 
the motion, by examining the pleadings and the evidence before it and by interrogating counsel, 
shall if practicable ascertain what material facts exist without substantial controversy and what 
material facts are actually and in good faith controverted. It shall thereupon make an order 
specifying the facts that appear without substantial controversy, including the extent to which the 
amount of damages or other relief is not in controversy, and directing such further proceedings in 
the action as are just. Upon the trial of the action the facts so specified shall be deemed 
established, and the trial shall be conducted accordingly. 
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Supporting and opposing 
affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible 
in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters 
stated therein. Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit 
shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The court may permit affidavits to be supplemented 
or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories, or further affidavits. When a motion for 
summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest 
upon the mere allegations or denials of the pleadings, but the response, by affidavits or as 
otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue 
for trial. Summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against a party failing to file such a 
response. 
(f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits of a party opposing 
the motion that the party cannot for reasons stated present by affidavit facts essential to justify 
the party's opposition, the court may refuse the application for judgment or may order a 
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continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had 
or may make such other order as is just. 
(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. If any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule are 
presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose of delay, the court shall forthwith order the party 
presenting them to pay to the other party the amount of the reasonable expenses which the filing 
of the affidavits caused, including reasonable attorney's fees, and any offending party or attorney 
may be adjudged guilty of contempt. 
[Amended effective November 1,1997; November 1, 2004.] 
Utah R. Civ. P. 56 
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U.C.A. 1953 § 57-1-32 
§ 57-1-32. Sale of trust property by trustee—Action to recover balance due upon obligation 
for which trust deed was given as security—Collection of costs and attorney's fees 
At any time within three months after any sale of property under a trust deed as provided in 
Sections 57-1-23, 57-1-24, and 57-1-27, an action may be commenced to recover the balance due 
upon the obligation for which the trust deed was given as security, and in that action the 
complaint shall set forth the entire amount of the indebtedness that was secured by the trust deed, 
the amount for which the property was sold, and the fair market value of the property at the date 
of sale. Before rendering judgment, the court shall find the fair market value of the property at 
the date of sale. The court may not render judgment for more than the amount by which the 
amount of the indebtedness with interest, costs, and expenses of sale, including trustee's and 
attorney's fees, exceeds the fair market value of the property as of the date of the sale. In any 
action brought under this section, the prevailing party shall be entitled to collect its costs and 
reasonable attorney fees incurred. 
Credits 
Laws 1961, c. 181, § 14; Laws 1985, c. 68, § 4; Laws 2001, c. 236, § 13, eff. April 30, 2001. 
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U.C.A. 1953 § 78B-6-908 
Formerly cited as UT ST § 78-37-9 
§ 78B-6-908. Attorney fees 
(1) In all cases of foreclosure when an attorneys fee is claimed by the plaintiff, the amount shall 
be fixed by the court. No other or greater amount shall be allowed or decreed than the sum which 
shall appear by the evidence to be actually charged by and to be paid to the attorney for the 
plaintiff. 
(2) If it shall appear that there is an agreement or understanding to divide the fees between the 
plaintiff and his attorney, or between the attorney and any other person except an attorney 
associated with him in the cause, the defendant shall only be ordered to pay the amount to be 
retained by the attorney or attorneys. 
Credits 
Laws 2008, c. 3, § 1004, eff. Feb. 7, 2008. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-908 (West) 
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Kevin has asked that I give an explanation oh the differences in tax returns. 
Before 1 begin, let me stress that the forms ybu have reflect an honest, true, and accurate 
reflection of the income that I receive. j 
Now for the explanation. • j 
Over 25 years ago, we found that as a business there were several very major and legal 
means to reduce the income we received for jtax purposes. And we set out to use all that 
were available to us. But this created several! problems as well 
One, I am in the habit of not only giving a fujll 10% tithe to our church, but I am also very 
generous in other areas like missionary, humanitarian aid, and education funds. These 
usually amount to about 19-20% of my gross income before any deductions or means of 
tax reduction. These by themselves could caiise a tax audit even if there were no other 
deductions. j 
But, to make it worse, by taking full advantage of all the means available by law, we 
ended up with it showing more in the 50% tq 60% range and that did trigger an audit 
every year for a number of years. Each time, j the IRS came in and looked at our figures 
and in the end agreed that we were in compliance with their code and that no taxes were 
due. But it took a great deal of time and frustration on our part to do this. At that time, we 
decided that a better method would be for us;to do the complete return and then take the 
final figures and submit those on a simple form. Again, in full compliance, but just not in 
a way that triggered an audit every year. 3mete filing this way, we have not had a single 
audit. But, if we did, we can show the exact imounts we did bring in., the deductions 
allowed by law we take, and for what purpose, and we end up with the exact same figures 
in the net results. It just does not bring up thej continual red flags. 
Then, that brought up other problems. Even though we were making a great deal of 
money, we did not have tax returns that showed the actual income. And even if we took 
the long forms, they too appeared that with all the business expenses that we were not 
making very much money. We were then unable to get any credit with local banks. We 
fought with this for years. Wc tried to show tjhat we were indeed making money, but that 
it was used in ways that we could show a deduction instead of a profit. Banker after 
banker said they were sorry, but they had to go with the net amounts on our returns. 
Maybe we are wrong, but we started doing the returns with the honest, true, and accurate 
amounts based on the 10% of gross income tjiat I pay as a tithe. Then we show the basic 
deductions of normal expenses used to get us to that point. We did not show the other tax 
write offe that bring us down to the point where we show little income. From that point 
on, we have been able to get the credit we deserve with our local banks. I am sorry that 
this has caused a problem in this case. i 
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Let me stress that the papers you have do in jfact show a true portrayal of the actual take 
home income that I take. They are not inflated in any way. They are what I have as an 
income. ! 
Now, if you want a well performing loan that will be paid on time each and every month 
without problems, 1 promise that this will bq it. I promise that it will be paid on the first 
day of each month, without fail In full. You! will never have a problem with this loan 
because of lack of payment. j 
But, if the paperwork causes a problem, and jyou do not wish for me to proceed, let me 
know and I will transfer it to someone else who knows that I will pay my obligations on 
time without fail. 
Sincerely, 
Mike Robertson 6-/6 r*? 
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FILED 
JUN 6 2011 
4TH DISTRICT 
STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH COUNTY 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH COMMUNITY CREDIT UNION, 
Plaintiff, : Memorandum Decision 
vs. : Date: June 1,2011 
MIKE L. ROBERTSON, SR., : Case No.: 100402192 
Defendant. : Division VII: Judge James R. Taylor 
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiffs Second Motion for Summary Judgment. 
The Plaintiff (hereinafter "UCCU") has asked for summary judgment 1) dismissing the 
Defendant's Counterclaim with prejudice and 2) ruling that UCCU has complied with paragraph 
22 of the Deed of Trust so that UCCU may proceed with foreclosure of the subject property. 
Undisputed Facts 
From a careful consideration of the submissions and affidavits the Court finds that some 
facts are not capable of reasonable dispute. On or near the first of May, 2009 Robertson applied 
for a loan from UCCU to enable the purchase of real property including a home in Spanish Fork. 
In support of the "Uniform Residential Loan Application," Robertson provided income 
information, disclosing an adjusted gross income in 2007 of $126,168 and in 2008 of $109,920. 
The Deed of Trust provided in paragraph 6 that Robertson would occupy the property as his 
Page 1 of 13 
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principal residence "unless extenuating circumstances exist which are beyond Borrower's 
control." The Deed of Trust also provided in paragraph 8 that Robertson would be in default if 
"materially false, misleading, or inaccurate information or statements" were made during the 
application process. The scope of paragraph 8 explicitly but not exclusively included statements 
relating to intended occupancy of the property. It was disclosed and Robertson understood that 
at the time of closing, UCCU intended to sell servicing rights to the account to Wells Fargo, 
effective July 29, 2009. The loan closed, the funds were disbursed, and title to the property 
subject to the Deed of Trust and Trust Deed Note was transferred to Robertson on May 28, 2009. 
Several weeks later during the transfer process to Wells Fargo it was discovered that 
Robertson had filed actual tax returns for the years 2007 and 2008 that were not the same as the 
returns provided during the loan application. In those returns he declared a gross income of less 
than $20,000 for each year. Robertson explained to an agent of UCCU that he had some time 
earlier adopted a business strategy of declaring less than his actual income to the Internal 
Revenue Service to avoid audits regularly triggered when he declared his full income but took 
advantage of legitimate deductions to reduce his taxable income. Unsatisfied with Robertson's 
explanation, UCCU referred the matter to counsel. Counsel notified Robertson in a letter dated 
June 26,2009 that the obligation was being accelerated and considered in default because of the 
inaccuracies regarding his income in the application process. Robertson swears that because of 
the uncertainty generated by the foreclosure and collection procedures he decided not to move 
Page 2 of 13 
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into the home. It was vacant for three months and then became occupied by Robertson's 
daughter. It has never been occupied as a residence by Robertson. 
UCCU filed a Motion for Summary Judgment to allow entry of a money judgment for the 
balance due under the Trust Deed Note. UCCU could then proceed with sale of the property to 
apply the proceeds to the obligation and seek an appropriate deficiency judgment if necessary. 
In its Memorandum Decision dated December 6, 2010 this Court found Robertson in default 
under the Deed of Trust because he provided materially misleading information during the loan 
application process and because he has failed to occupy the property within 60 days of closing. 
However, this Court denied UCCU's request for immediate judgment and authorization to 
continue with the trustee's sale because UCCU failed to demonstrate compliance with the 
contract requirement for acceleration of the balance due. 
Legal Standard 
Summary judgment "shall be rendered if the pleadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a 
matter of law." Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). Additionally, "the facts and all reasonable inferences 
drawn therefrom [are viewed] in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." Jackson v. 
Mateus, 70 P.3d 78, 80 (Utah 2003) (internal citations omitted). Summary judgment "denies the 
opportunity of trial [and so] should be granted only when it clearly appears that there is no 
Page 3 of 13 
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reasonable probability the party moved against could prevail." Utah State Univ. of Agric. 
Applied Sci. v. Sutro & Co.. 646 P.2d 715, 720 n.14 (Utah 1982). 
Furthermore, "it is inappropriate for courts to weigh disputed material facts in ruling on a 
summary judgment. It matters not that the evidence on one side may appear to be strong or even 
compelling. One sworn statement under oath is all that is needed to dispute the averments on the 
other side of the controversy and create and issue of fact, precluding the entry of summary 
judgment." Lucky Seven Rodeo Corp. v. Clark, 755 P.2d 750, 752 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) 
(internal citations omitted). 
This Court will first address the notice requirements of the Deed of Trust and 
Robertson's alleged cure of the default. The Court will then examine each cause of action that 
Robertson asserted in his counterclaim in light of the Court's findings on these preliminary 
issues. Finally, the Court will address the issue of attorney's fees. 
Notice Requirements of Paragraph 22 of the Deed of Trust 
Paragraph 22 of the Deed of Trust provides a very specific process that must be followed 
prior to acceleration following a breach of any covenant by the Robertson. Notice of a breach 
must specify: "(a) the default; (b) the action required to cure the default; (c) a date, not less than 
30 days from the date the notice. . . by which the default must be cured; and (d) that failure to 
cure the default will result in acceleration of the sums secured. . . and the sale of the property." 
UCCU sent a letter dated May 24, 2010 that satisfies the requirements of Paragraph 22 of the 
Page 4 of 13 
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Deed of Trust. It notified Robertson that he was in default because he failed to occupy the home 
within 60 days of executing the Deed of Trust as the Deed of Trust required and because he 
"provided false tax returns . . . in connection to his application." The notice advised Robertson 
of the action required to cure the default by stating 1) he must occupy the home as his primary 
residence and 2) he must either provide documentation verifying that the tax returns he provided 
to UCCU were the tax returns he filed with the United States or paying UCCU "all principal, 
interest, attorney's fees, costs, interest and applicable fees to date." The notice gave Robertson 
until June 24, 2010, 30 days from the date of the notice, to cure the default. Lastly, the notice 
provided that "[i]f Mr. Robertson does not cure the default by June 24, 2010, UCCU may 
accelerate the debt... and may foreclose upon the property that secures the loan." 
Robertson argues that the May 24, 2010 notice was not "legal notice" because it was not 
sent to the correct address. Robertson declared that he did not see the notice until UCCU filed 
this motion, and the Court will assume this fact is true for purposes of this motion. Although 
Robertson did not receive a copy of the notice, the notice was also sent to Robertson's attorney, 
Richard D. Bradford. This fulfilled the notice requirement because "an attorney is the agent of 
the client and knowledge of any material facts possessed by the attorney is imputed to the 
client." Von Hake v.Thomas. 858 P.2d 193,194 n.3 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). This is sufficient to 
satisfy the notice requirements of the Deed of Trust. 
Robertson's Alleged Cure of the Default 
Page 5 of 13 
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Robertson argues that he cured his default in accordance with Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-31 
by timely making each payment due under the Note. Prior to 1985, UCA. § 57-1-31 provided a 
debtor in default with a statutory opportunity to cure the default in a judicial foreclosure. 
Washington Nat. Ins. Co. v. Sherwood Associates, 795 P.2d 665, 666 (Utah App. 1990). Since 
this section of the Code was amended in 1985, no statutory right to cure remains under this 
section if the beneficiary chooses to enforce his or her rights by judicial foreclosure. Id at 666-
667. Under Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-23, "it is made optional with the beneficiary of the trust 
deed whether to foreclose the trust property after a breach of an obligation in a manner provided 
for foreclosure of mortgages or to have the trustee proceed under the power of sale provided 
therein." Security Title Co. v. Pavless Builders Supply, 407 P.2d 141, 142 (Utah 1965). 
Because UCCU chose the option of commencing a judicial mortgage foreclosure action, UCA § 
57-1-31 is not applicable to this action. Title 78B, Chapter 6, Part 9 of the Utah Code governs 
this action, and it does not provide any statutory method of curing the debtor's default in order to 
avoid foreclosure. See UCA §§ 78B-6-901 through 78B-6-909. 
Furthermore, Robertson cannot cure his default under the Deed of Trust by simply 
remitting payment under the Note because his default stemmed from his misrepresentation to 
UCCU during the application process and his failure to occupy the property as his residence 
within 60 days of closing. Robertson's default would only be cured if he "fully and timely 
performed] his obligations under the agreement." Grossenv. DeWitt 982 P.2d 581, 585 (Utah 
Page 6 of 13 
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Ct. App. 1999) (holding that defendant did not cure the default by making payment "because the 
taxes remained unpaid and the property remained uninsured" as required by the parties' 
agreement). 
Defendant's Counterclaim 
Economic Loss Doctrine (Fifth, Sixth. Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Causes of Action) 
U[A] party suffering only economic loss from the breach of an express or implied 
contractual duty may not assert a tort claim for such a breach absent an independent duty of care 
under tort law." Hermansen v. Tasulis, 48 P.3d 235, 240 (Utah 2002) (emphasis in original). 
Economic loss is defined as: 
Damages for inadequate value, costs of repair and replacement of the defective product, 
or consequent loss of profits-without any claim of personal injury or damage to other 
property . . . as well as the diminution in the value of the product because it is inferior in 
quality and does not work for the general purposes for which it was manufactured and 
sold. 
American Towers Owners Ass'n, Inc. v. CCI Mechanical, Inc., 930 P.2d 1182,1189 
(Utah 1996) (internal citations and quotations omitted). 
Robertson's Counterclaim does not allege personal injury or damage to other property, 
but asserts damages properly characterized as an economic loss. UCCU did owe a duty to deal 
fairly and honestly with Robertson, but that duty is not independent of the parties' contractual 
relationship. A lender has no duty to "specifically request tax returns if it is going to sell a loan 
to another institution." See Def.'s Mem. in Opp'n to PL's Second Mot. for Summ. J. at 18. 
Page 7 of 13 
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Robertson's fifth, sixth, seventh, eighth, and ninth causes of action are barred by the economic 
loss doctrine because UCCU did not owe a duty to Robertson independent of their contractual 
relationship. Each of these causes of action is dismissed. 
Specific Performance ("First Cause of Action) 
This Court ruled in its Memorandum Decision dated December 6, 2010 that "Robertson 
is in default under the Deed of Trust because he provided materially misleading information 
during the loan application process and because he has failed to occupy the property within 60 
days of closing." Mem. Decision at 8. Robertson's specific performance cause of action to 
enforce the contract is rendered moot because of Robertson's default under the Deed of Trust, 
and is therefore dismissed. 
Breach of Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing f Second Cause of Action) 
Robertson asserts that UCCU breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing by accelerating the Note without providing Robertson with notice of his right to cure. 
As this Court established, UCCU provided Robertson with proper notice, and Robertson failed to 
cure the default. Furthermore, in seeking equitable relief, Robertson himself must act in good 
faith. Hone v. Hone. 95 P.3d 1221, 1223 (Utah App. 2004). 
Robertson did not act in good faith because "he provided materially misleading 
information during the loan application process and because he. . . failed to occupy the property 
within 60 days of closing." Mem. Decision dated Dec. 6,2010 at 8. UCCU acted in good faith 
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when it initiated foreclosure proceedings against Robertson because it had determined that 
Robertson was in default under the Deed of Trust after consulting with Robertson about the 
alleged tax returns that Robertson provided. UCCU properly provided notice, and Robertson did 
not properly cure his default by continuing to make payments to UCCU. By accepting 
Robertson's payments, UCCU did not waive Robertson's breach. The Deed of Trust expressly 
provides that "[a]ny forbearance by Lender in exercising any right or remedy... shall not be a 
waiver of or preclude the exercise of any right or remedy." ^ 12. Consequently, this Court finds 
that because UCCU did not breach the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, this cause 
of action is dismissed. 
Declaratory Relief (Third Cause of Action) 
Robertson's request for a judicial determination of his rights and duties is rendered moot 
because this Court held Robertson to be in default of the contract. Mem. Decision dated Dec. 6, 
2010 at 8. Because Robertson defaulted by providing misleading information to UCCU, he is 
not entitled to pay less than the full amount of the Note. Robertson's cause of action for 
declaratory relief is dismissed as moot. 
Breach of Contract (Fourth Cause of Action) 
UCCU did not breach the contract by seeking a judicial foreclosure because Robertson 
was in default. Mem. Decision dated Dec. 6, 2010 at 8. UCCU was entitled to seek legal redress 
upon Robertson's default. Therefore, Robertson's cause of action for breach of contract is 
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dismissed. 
Promissory Estoppel (Tenth Cause of Action) 
The doctrine of promissory estoppel is applicable when enforcement of a promise is the 
only way to avoid injustice. Hess v. Johnston, 163 P.3d 747, 754 (Utah App. 2007). In order to 
prevail in a promissory estoppel claim, Robertson must demonstrate the following four elements: 
(1) [Robertson] acted with prudence and in reasonable reliance on 
a promise made by [UCCUJ; (2) [UCCU] knew that [Robertson] 
relied on the promise which [UCCU] should reasonably expect to 
induce action or forbearance on the part of [Robertson] or a third 
person; (3) [UCCU] was aware of all material facts; and (4) 
[Robertson] relied on the promise and the reliance resulted in a 
loss to [him]. 
Id (quoting Youngblood v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 158 P.3d 1088 (Utah 2007)). 
Robertson has demonstrated that he did not act with prudence and could not have 
reasonably relied on a statement from UCCU that his paperwork was in order because Robertson 
had actual knowledge that the paperwork he provided to UCCU contained material 
misrepresentations about his financial status. Furthermore, at the time Robertson submitted 
these financial documents, UCCU was not aware of the material fact that the financial 
documents were not what Robertson purported them to be. Robertson has not proved a valid 
claim of promissory estoppel, and his tenth cause of action is therefore dismissed. 
Attorney's Fees and Costs 
UCCU requests that Robertson pay all of its attorney's fees and costs, which totaled 
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$20,409.72 as of the date UCCU filed its reply. When a plaintiff to a foreclosure action requests 
attorney's fees, the Court sets the amount of attorney's fees that should be paid. UCA § 78B-6-
908 (2010). The fee must be reasonable under all the facts and circumstances as well as the 
evidence in the record. Associated Indus. Developments, Inc. v. Jewkes, 701 P.2d 486, 488 
(Utah 1984) (citing Jensen v. Lichenstein, 45 Utah 320 (1914)). 
Counsel for UCCU charges an hourly rate of $200.00 per hour. This is a reasonable 
hourly rate in light of the rates charged by attorneys in the area. Robertson has not prevailed on 
any issue set forth in his counterclaim. Furthermore, given Robertson's intentional 
misrepresentation to UCCU, which fueled the judicial foreclosure process, an award of 
attorney's fees is appropriate in this matter. Robertson's argument that UCCU is not entitled to 
attorney's fees because Robertson never received notice under the requirements of paragraph 22 
of the Deed of Trust fails because this Court holds that he received valid notice through his 
attorney. Under the circumstances of this case, UCCU is entitled to Ml payment of their 
attorney's fees in the amount of $20,409.72. . 
Conclusion 
Robertson defaulted by providing false or misleading information during the loan 
application process which was specifically intended to mislead the lender. Moreover, he failed 
to personally occupy the premises as agreed. The loan was properly accelerated and Robertson 
failed to cure the default by repaying the note as agreed. Attorney fees and costs are the liability 
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of Robertson under the terms of the note and the amounts claimed by counsel for UCCU are 
reasonable and appropriate. As a matter of law, the counterclaims asserted by Robertson cannot 
be sustained. The motion for summary judgment is granted. Counsel for UCCU should prepare 
an appropriate order pursuant to Rule 7, URCP. 
Dated this 1^4&M>£MZV72011 
A certificate of mailing is on the following page. 
* '^o 
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